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relationships
between Western naand Third World countries hinge, to
:=. -;ge extent, on the cornmun ications that
between the two political-cultural
. The importance of cornmunications
come under increasingly intense scruas a consequence of many factors;
ipally, thoughful persons throughout
~ orld have become aware that "the
that influence consciousness are
~ - ive determinants of a community's
k and the nature and direction of its
s" (Schiller, 1976: 1).
this awareness has grown, it has
me clear that communications, more
economics or politics, determine the
=--wdes of the peop Ie of one country
rd those of another: domination of
ing, one might say, establishes
a
~ effective form of control than ecoicorpolitical
domination from outside.
'ost importantly, the communications
ination equates with cultural dominain many cases. Where Western nations
as France, Great Britain, Japan, the
_ eel States, and West Germany are coned, trade normally follows the path
into the Third World-Africa,
Asia,
Latin America-by
the communicaprocess. But even before that can
oen, communications
have prepareo
ay for acceptance of great-power
s and services: a kind of cultural
_ ration of the ground. Behind the en-I€twork
of Western processes and ines lies a "marketing system decoed to sell industry's outpouring of
- ely inauthentic)
consumer goods"
is also used to sell, globally, "ideas,
,preferences, and beliefs" (Schiller,

= : 3).
this system of international comications and information functions,
what its effects are, requires deeper
- ination if alternatives are to be isoand their validity measured.
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Critical Assessment of the Flow of
Cultural Materials and Information
In today's context, as the world approaches the final two decades of the 20th
century, cultural materials flow across international boundaries and oceans in immense quantities, often in the form of
purely communicational
materials and
information. The cultural core of such materials is unmistakable;
they reflect the
interests, bel iefs and ideas of the societies
that spawned them, and purvey messages
that are designed to mold attitudes.
Historically, certain trends have influenced the flow of these materials. In the
period immediately following World War
II, the principle of laissez-faire applied
almost universally in the world of communications and cultural exchange. Against
that background, the media in the United
States quickly gained supremacy over the
media of other countries. Between 1948
and 1968,

new communications technologycomputers, space satellites, television
-combined with a powerful and expanding corporate business system,
assisted the push of the United States
into the center of the world economy.
Without public pronouncements, private, American-made media products
and United States informational networks blanketed the world. (Schiller,
1977.'112)
The past decade has seen a gradually
intensifying change in attitude toward the
established American hegemony in both
the informational and cultural arenas. The
right of the med ia to invade the privacy of
the home, without control or supervision,
has come into question as the world's new
nations have shown growing concern for
their national and cultural sovereignty.
The feel ing has become more and more
general, and has been expressed explicitly, that the nation whose mass media are
dominated from outside is not really a free
state. Freedom for one party, in brief, may
mean continuation of inequality for another:

Freedoms
which are formally im- 33
pressive may be substantively oppressive when they reinforce prevailing inequalities while claiming to be providing generalized opportunity for all.
Not surprisingly, individuals, groups,
and nations are seeking means to limit
the freedom to maintain inequality.
Measures aimed at regulating "the free
flow of information" are best understood _
in this perspective. (Schiller, 1977: 114)
How cultural domination is secured presents a study in conquest by verbal and
visual infiltration. The American media,
since World War II, have taken over areas
of the world once served by the French
and British news agencies. At least four
trends have become observable in recent
years: The American med ia gain influence
over foreign media, sometimes to the
point where the foreign agencies do little
more than transmit American press or
program materials; an international (or
transnational) information elite develops;
mass media contribute to the spread of an
Americanized world-culture;
and, finally,
the media help to shape an interdependent, but Americanized, world. (U. S., 1977

26).
Exchange processes
controlling
the
distribution
of television and film programs and materials provide a special
case in point illustrating
how cultural
domination becomes effective. The pattern as exemplified in the international TV
marketplace
has been described
by a
United States government committee report:

.. the high technology medium was
developed here and soon saturated the
national market; shortly thereafter it
sought foreign expansion. Some foreign
governments, particularly in less-developed countries, indirectly encouraged
its spread by contracting for U. S. technical assistance, and even permitted
American financial investments in local
TV.
S., 1977: 21)
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on foreign screens as a result of the operation of similar dynamics. American companies have enjoyed larger budgets for
film production and distribution than foreign companies; of curcial importance,
they could offer foreign producers "an integrated global distribution
system for
their films" (Guback, 1977: 26), a situation
that has forced many Latin American and
other foreign producers to go through
major American companies to have their
films distributed within their own continental market regions.
The results have been predictable,
American companies in recent years have
forged what amounts to a monopoly on
moving picture distribution throughout the
world; "American products not only numerically dominate the universal flow of
pictures but become the models of the
international
commercial
culture"
(Guback, 1977: 26). American-made films are
shown in more than 100 foreign countries,
and approximately one-half of all the theatrical revenues of American fi 1m manufacturers come from abroad.
Movie and television exports have unquestionably
outstripped the press and
radio as instruments of what has been
called "cultural homogenization"
in foreign countries. Because the products for
export are commercially oriented in nearly
all cases, "everywhere
local culture is
facing submersion from the mass-produced outpourings of commercial broadcasting" (Schiller, 1971: 112). But even
those products that bear the stamp of
official U. S. government authorship-of
the United States Information Agency in
particular, USIA-carry
the American cultural message. 1V shows produced by the
USIA have been shown in as many as 97
different foreign countries, but are not
usually identified as USIA products (Schiller, 1971: 81). [The USIA is now called International Commun ications Agency, ICA.]
Transfer of Communications
Technology
The

problems

involved

in transferring
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communications
technology
from one
country to another can only be described
as mountainous:
Most of these [small and poor states]
are unable to finance independently the
establishment, maintenance, and operation of broadcast facilities. They rely
increasingly on either foreign capital to
both install facilities and provide programming in a package deal, which
quickly turns the broadcast structures
into miniature Western (or, Eastern) systems, or on a supply of low-cost foreign
(mostly American) material which originally was produced 'to the specifications of commercial sponsors. (Schiller,

1971: 114)
Even more seriously, such transfers of
technology involves the importation into
host nations of programming that "has not
been made with the requ irements of the
importing nation in view, and, if anything,
it presents images and styles of life that
are wildly out of keeping with the social
necessities
of most of the 'have-not'
states" (Schiller, 1971: 114).
Two factors characterize and explain
the contemporary Western effort to export
communications
technology.
First, the
profits to be gained are enormous: ''.
from 1960 to 1973 the dollar value of [the
communications
goods and services exported by the United States alone] ... has
tripled; those exports, worth over a billion
dollars, favorably affect the U. S. balance
of payments position"
(U. S., 1977: 6).
Second, the recipient nation becomes the
communications
and cultural dependent
of the exporting nation once the technology transfer has taken place. Technology
exported under the rubric of "free flow of
information"
becomes
"the
channel
through which life styles and value systems can be imposed on poor and vulnerable societies" (Schiller, 1971: 9).
It can be maintained, nonetheless, that
if a country is to become politically and
economically
autonomous, it must possess the tools of communication.
"It is
understandable that the ... technology of

broadcast commun ications shou Id a
strikingly impressive to leadership 9
in states still trapped in economic sta~ tion but desperately striving for imp
ment" (Schiller, 1971: 109). Also, and _
ically, the governments of these na
want to tell their stories as effective
the purveyors of communications
anc formation from the outside.

-=-

Education of the populace has to
come one of the key purposes of the
communications establishment if illitera
and all the ilis that attend it are to be erc:-icated. Yet even where good intenti
originally underlie efforts to expand
communications
technology of a g- country, events sometimes intervenetilt the scale toward the negative side.

=-=

The case of Ghana has been citeo,
this country, the original plan was to
ate the national television system
more than 80 percent Ghanaian progrc::-mingo "The planners were determined
to develop the appetite for cowboy
tures" (Shayon, 1977: 51). In time,
ever, it proved impossible to support
1V system with the revenues from
annual license fees-$12
per set per y
-levied
on the country's 15,000 set (Hi, ers. To close the revenue gap, the G
naian television system began to accec
advertising,
whereupon the advertisers
insisted that popular shows be show
What the planners feared had occurrec.
the "horse opera" began to appear repeatedly on Ghanaian 1V screens. In E
short time Ghana's television service ~
providing only 40 percent of the prograrr.ming used on the national system.

-=-

Such occurrences reinforce the belief
now becoming more common in Thi
World nations, that the development
national communications
systems mu
be a total process. They can-must-bE
international in the sense that much tech-nology has to be imported. But irnportatioc
has to be both selective and reciprocal
In expanding communications systems
the governments of the "have-not" nations
are more and more refusing to adopt on

3
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i:lOlesale basis plans advanced byWestnations and are, instead, attempting
fit new technological developments
:a:> schemes that take into account na- al or popular interests and priorities.
=:;orts are going forward right now to en- e that communications expansion anrers mass and individual needs; the
-::.man element is receiving attention,
ile economic goals and strategies also
"" re in the overall planning.
eciprocity presents another problem
--:personal, heavy-handed dissemination
-.:= unassorted materials by means of the
-:css and the electronic media has been
=aen increasingly as ruling out interper- al feedback of any kind; it also rules
response,with the resuIt that adequate
:::::mmunicationstechnology may be avai 1= Ie, or may be made available through
- international transfer process, while
- obvious lack of genuine cornrnunica-- exists.
The United Nations Development SupCommunication Service (DSCS) has
:Ben viewed as a step forward. Based in
.3IDgkok, the agency stresses human un::astanding of, and participation in, de_Iopment programs. Technical commu=eation factors involved in local man::gement, training, and community level
- elopment programs are considered
part of an effort to analyze popular
avior; communications technology
t would be shovel-fed to many whose
s have been disrupted by Western
-ooernization is to be avoided. Known
- a "third-generation communications
:mject," the DSCS has built on earlier ex:ariences that involved abortive efforts to
- elop the Third World with audiovisual
ipment first, and training personnel
- ~erward.
Still another indication that many Third
rid and some developed nations have
=egun to scrutinize the meaning of tech- ogy transfer may be found in the relions to satellite communications. In
zeory, the new system offers an almost
iraculous means of beaming television

programming across as much as one-third
of the earth's surface. In fact, the satellite
method "has created another paradox of
... communication: the contrast between
the worldwide potential of this technological advance and the alarm and controversy the prospect has provoked among
nations" (Riegel, 1977 68).
The controversy turns on the feel ing,
common among Western European nations as well as Third World countries, that
the communications satellite system
would give the United States yet another
means of violating national sovereigntypol itically, socially, culturally, and in other
ways.
The apprehensions of those who object
to unrestricted acceptance of the satellite
system have been seen as clustering in
three main areas: (1) fear of propaganda
and provocation, especially through use
of material that would increase tensions
domestically or with other nations, cause
disunity, or disturb domestic or international tranquillity; (2) fear of commercial
aggression-for example, in material that
would arouse desires for different products or ad ifferent standard of Iife, creating
unrest,disturbing the economic order, and
putting nations at a disadvantage in domestic and world markets; and (3) fear
of corruption of culture-for example, by
material thatwould offend trad itions, damage values, and attract whole populations
to alien cultures and standards that are
considered inferior to the native ones
(Riegel, 1977 69).
Such fears are based in legitimate concerns. That direct broadcasting into
homes is not yet possible appears only to
have intensified the international debate
and to have strengthened the determination of many countries to resist this new
form of communications imperialism.
In the simplest terms, "the technical
problem has been either to increase the
transmitting power of satellites, or the
sensitivity of receiving antennas, or both,
so that television signals can be received
by small inexpensive antennas on stand-

ard receiving sets" (Riegel, 1977: 68-69).
But in view of the adverse reactions, the
likelihood is strong that many countries
will find means of discouraging or preventing altogether within their national
boundaries the so-called "free flow of information" that the satellites apparently
further.

35

Role of Ideology in Revolutionary
Communications

Whatever the divisive effects of the communications satellite, the Third World essentially believes that its best interests
involve a policy of non-alignment with
either the First or the Second Worlds. This
is the core meaning of non-alignment: the
Third World nations of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America are pursuing a common
struggle outside the huge and hungry
spheres of influence established by the
Western powers on the one hand, and the
communist powers on the other. But the
pol icy of non-aIignment must be rooted
in ideology or it cannot have long-term
significance or effect: a war for cultural
sovereignty must have the same driving
force of belief and commitment behind it
that a war for political and military domination or survival must have.
In actuality, the non-aligned nations see
the struggle as a war inwhich the "friends"
and the "enemies" of the Third World
countries have been difficult to identify.
The effort to achieve such identification
must nonetheless be made
Non-aligned countries' allies are progressive writers, artists, thinkers, teachers, mass communications researchers
in the industrialized countries, partic~
ularly the United States. The nonaligned's enemies are the multinationals (or transnationals) ofthe information
(or consciousness) industry and their
subsidiaries within the "Third World."
(van Dinh, 1976.39)
With such a formula for identifying friend
and foe, the war against cultural imperialism can proceed; this war "cannot be won
except by a protracted, non-violent (only

http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol6/iss1/9
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ideas will be killed) guerrilla warfare"
(van Dinh, 1976 39).
On what basis is this ideology of nonalignment to rest? Most fundamentally, it
must proceed in the general direction
specified at the Non-Alignment
Summit
Meetings in Algiers in 1973, and at Colombo in 1976. The tenets that give continuity to this direction include the "masses
line" that holds that the masses in the
Third World are being exploited and the
"classes line" that indicates that the exploiters are the entrepreneurs of the Westem market economies; the initiative that
promotes the growth of an organic culture
without blind rejection of all that is foreign;
and, finally, the awareness that culture
cannot be divorced from politics.
In this dispensation for the Third World,
all revolutionary communications must be
steeped in the appropriate ideology. The
revolution, after all, has as its primary goal
the replacement of the imperialist system
of communications
that destroys national
pride and national identity with a system
that unlocks the potential of each Third
World nation and allows it to develop independently. The problem is simple:

In the still-unindustrialized countries,
struggling to overcome their economic
dependency, national independence
and social transformation are blocked
to the extent that the communications
system is controlled by or represents
the dominating class, externally or internally based. (Schiller, 1976: 68)
The rhetoric of Third World spokesmen
for political independence
and cultural
autonomy obviously follows the Marxist
line. But this rhetoric cannot be presumed
to imply any kind of philosophical or ideological relationship between Third World
communications and the communications
practiced in communist or Marxist-socialist countries. Where communications
are
employed under communism as a means
of control, they are viewed in the Third
World as opening a road to liberation-if
they really serve the particular nation's
basic interests.
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The difference is fundamental. Communications, in the communist view, must
serve a specific purpose: they must bring
theworld closertothe universal "socialist"
order. Like law and all other social institutions, commun ist commun ications with in
communist countries, and to other nations,
are subordinated
to the end goal; they
have nothing to do with reality or fact "As
the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia
has amply shown, propaganda for 'peaceful coexistence' has not made the Russians any less prone to 'big-nation chauvinism'" (Hsiung, 1970: 165).
To the extent to which communications
processes and modes of dealing with
facts and human materials in the capitalist
societies have developed naturally and
without conscious ideological
purpose,
they may be seen as less insidious than
communist-socialist
means and materials
of communication.
But the Third World
mind can, with reason, perceive Westem
communications as more dangerous than
communist. The reason is obvious: Western press, radio, film, and TV exports reach
the Third World as a deluge of more or
less tawdry and socially destructive creations-most
of them geared to the lowest
common denominators of popularWestern
taste-and
all of them designed to serve
a commercial purpose. To countries becoming evermore aware that communications and the informational apparatus
that transmits them. are powerful engines
"for great forward drives in the developmental process"
(Schiller, 1971: 109),
Western-style communications
must appear to present real dangers. Because
nearly all communications, as noted, carry
a cultural message, the imports from the
West inevitably become examples of cultural imperialism. They place the Third
World under "electronic siege;" they raise
the spectre of a propaganda machine that
will subvert Third World peoples and draw
them "under the yoke of a pattern of civilization not conforming to their national
patrimony" and unconnected with their
"real requirements" (Tunisian Symposium,
1976: no p.).

The View Ahead
The need for alternatives to Western d
ination of the Third World's channels
communication
has never been
pressing.

-

=-

The communications-cultural co
nent has been enjoying a contin
expansion in all market economies...
seems likely to become ... a cmics.
not the central, locus of the tim:
struggle within and against capitali
(Schiller, 1976: 69)

=

Since Western nations such as Canaca
Great Britain, and others have bequn z
scrutinize their national communicati
establishments and policies, it might expected
that an even more int
search for alternatives would be unde=
taken in the formerly colonial world; a,
that search is in fact well underway.
The slogans that encapsulize and gspecificity to the ideology of Third WOfirebellion against Western cultural irnpecalism suggest some of the alternati
open to African, Asian, and Latin Am~can nations. The key slogans are two number: tradition and revolution. In
most basic interpretation, tradition ref '0::
to "historical continuity" in the developioc
countries while revolution means "tha
transformation
of national
informaticr
structures"
along the masses-classes
lines (van Dinh, 1976: 39). But the revolution must also raise the complementa
banners of self-rei iance and international
ism.
Global goals, such as those expresseo
in the slogans, remain general izations
even though they serve an ideological
purpose. More pointed in view of the reality that Western technology with all its
evils has already invaded much of the
world is this question: Is a viable alternative conceivable? Schiller has suggested
one answer:

=

One possible approach is to reject
the prevailing features of Western tech- '
nology while examining possible alternative directions that technological discovery might have taken if the motiva-
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tions and incentives and distribution of
social power had been different .... In
the development of this or that process
or product or machine, there are alternatives and different opportunities.
(Schiller, 1976: 55)

a common concern with the content of
what is transmitted" (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 1966: 9). At the same
session, the director-general of All-India
Radio said:
... a whole wotta let loose on unsuspecting and comparatively less sophisticated people may have far-reaching
consequences. Unless these forces are
internationally controlled, it will be difficult to say whether the advantages will
outweigh the disadvantages. In the ultimate analysis, freedom may have to
be interpreted not merely as a removal
of censorship, but as a creation of opportunities. (UNESCO, 1966: 7)

provide elements of popular education,
general information, and entertainment.

37

Against this background, international
telecommunications policies have remained a matter of intense debate. But
effective agreement in the United Nations
or elsewhere appears to Iie far, in the fuThe imp Iications of a broad new scrutiny
ture. Compounding all other difficulties,
the purposes and uses of Western comthe United States has steadfastly es-,unications technology in Third World
poused the free-flow pol icy despite almost
::ountries are numerous. Deceleration of
unanimous opposition from the internarace to adopt Western methods, whi Ie
tional commun ity.Differences of approach
-- dying purposes more pertinent to the
to the communications satellite question
eds of specific nations, ranks as an imhave been a focal point of the continuing
oortant possibility. Establishment of condiscussion.
But cultural imperialism as
Is over internal communications in acexpressed in Western domination in the
:ordance with the communist-socialist
press, radio, and film areas have proved
lOde I could "provide a breathing space,
Some efforts on the part of Third World only slightly less disruptive, a fact that
apause" and "allow selectivity to become
nations to overcome cultural domination will undoubtedly surface at the forthcom~ basic operating mechanism for evaluatwhat may be useful" (Schiller, 1976: have been effective; while others have ing World Radio Conference in 1979,
_ ). As this process goes forward, the in- failed. The example of Ghana has been
Among these subsidiary issues, dominoted. By contrast, Peru appears to have nation of international press coverage by
- - tions and individuals required for asestablished controls that can effectively the Western nations=In
sessrnent of the utility value of particular
particular the
protect the nation's cultural sovereignty. United States-has become increasingly
s of hardware or software could proIn general, the controls were designed to sensitive. The entire debate has come to
ceed.
enforce emphasis on national goals, in- be seen as integral tothe broader struggle
The United Nations has sought to assist
crease media stress on education, ensure setting the Western powers against the
Third World's drive for communicaattention to cultural, social, and artistic Third World on the questions of "imbals-cultural autonomy. In 1972, the
values, and give the Peruvian public a ance, distortion, bias, news imperialism"
_ ited Nations Educational, Scientific,
more active role in mass communication and the "nature of the international media
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) asprocesses. The government appeared to network and of the transmission across
ed the need for agreements between
have recognized that if changes were to national and cultural frontiers of different
=tes on the right to broadcast directly by
be successful "in other areas of national types of med ia materials" (Harris, 1978:
ell ite to national popu lations. Twoyears
life, the mass media have to cooperate" 81). Third World spokesmen have con:=-er,the same UN agency approved a
(de Sagasti Perrett, 1977: 146).
for 1977-82 that underscored the
tended that "steps must be taken to rectify
Other nations have undertaken similar
d for complementing the free-flow-ofthis situation and institute a new informa- rmation approach with the idea of a programs of direction and control. India tion order" throughout the "have-not" rere balanced and objective flow be- has devised a system of "democratic pergions (Harris, 1978: 82).
eeen countries, and within and between suasion to bring about participation and
The evidence advanced in proof of
cooperation of all" along with "democratic
ions.
Third World contentions is preeminently
::arlier, in 1965, UNESCO had ex- planning ... at all levels" (Singh, 1977:
convincing.
essed concern regarding the future im- 156).
Underlying the data [in support of the
And Malaysia, a nation in the throes of
...c.. t of communications satellites on the
basic contention] was the basic posiorld. It discussed the need for "protec- continuing revolution, has instituted strict
tion that ... the underdeveloped Third
of national sovereignty by some kind radio-TV controls designed to inform the
World is largely dependent for foreign
-=orogram control" (Schiller, 1971: 124). public on governmental policies and pronews on the international [Western]
- ciently, a UNESCO official com- grams, stimulate interest to achieve govagencies and that this dependence
- ted: "I believe such co-operation (in- ernment-sponsored changes, promote
means that the images of the world reational) must extend beyond the tech- civic consciousness, foster the developceived in the Third World are-biased
cues of communication to embrace also ment of Malaysian arts and culture, and
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towards a Western concept of reality.
(Harris, 1978.' 83)
A call was issued at the fourth session
of the International Association for Mass
Communications Research in 1976 for
establishment of an independent news
pool for non-aligned countries. The goals
of the pool, now in existence, had been
set out as follows:
The press agencies pool of the nonaligned countries agreed upon by the
non-aligned countries is intended to
achieve' the broad and free circulation
among themselves of news, informative
reports, features and photographs about
each other, and also provide objective
and authentic information relating the
non-aligned countries to the rest ofthe
world. (Harris, 1978: 92-93)
None of the Third World agencies participating in the pool was to playa dominant role. The pool was not, it was maintained, designed to replace the Western
agencies that operate throughout much
of the West and the Third World.
Intercommunication between the Third
World countries is seen as a way of filling the gaps left by the Western agencies, as a means of compensating for
. their mistakes and above all as a way
of ensuring a regular interchange of
information between Third World countries. (Harris, 1978: 93)
The pool was set up to circulate news
among Third World countries and to deliver Third World news to the rest of the
world on a continuing basis.
Also, the press pool stands as a symbol
of far broader differences. These can be
summarized in the question: Free flow of
information or cultural imperialism? On
the basis of the evidence, the former only
masks the latter which is the true reality.U
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